Robin Hanson’s recent post “Two Types of Envy”, on the similarities & differences of redistribution of wealth vs the redistribution of sex, has generated quite a lot of heat and noise. Most of it (on all sides) is the usual horror-show that every internet controversy becomes. But I ran across a few things that I thought were interesting & thought-provoking reads. In the unlikely event that this post spreads beyond my blog’s usual audience, please note that by saying that I find these posts philosophically interesting, I am not taking or advocating any particular stance on the issue. Also note that while this post will be auto-shared to Facebook, I will not see any comments posted there.
- Amia Srinivasan in the London Review of Books: “Does anyone have the right to sex?” (written prior to Hanson’s blog post, but responding to the same recent events)
- Scott Aaronson in Shtetl-Optimized: “The Zeroth Commandment“
- Ross Douthat in the NYT: “The Redistribution of Sex“
- Andrea Long Chu, “On Liking Women” (only sort of related, but linked from one of the above)
The question, then, is how to dwell in the ambivalent place where we acknowledge that no one is obligated to desire anyone else, that no one has a right to be desired, but also that who is desired and who isn’t is a political question, a question usually answered by more general patterns of domination and exclusion. It is striking, though unsurprising, that while men tend to respond to sexual marginalisation with a sense of entitlement to women’s bodies, women who experience sexual marginalisation typically respond with talk not of entitlement but empowerment. Or, insofar as they do speak of entitlement, it is entitlement to respect, not to other people’s bodies. That said, the radical self-love movements among black, fat and disabled women do ask us to treat our sexual preferences as less than perfectly fixed. ‘Black is beautiful’ and ‘Big is beautiful’ are not just slogans of empowerment, but proposals for a revaluation of our values. Lindy West describes studying photographs of fat women and asking herself what it would be to see these bodies – bodies that previously filled her with shame and self-loathing – as objectively beautiful. This, she says, isn’t a theoretical issue, but a perceptual one: a way of looking at certain bodies – one’s own and others’ – sidelong, inviting and coaxing a gestalt-shift from revulsion to admiration. The question posed by radical self-love movements is not whether there is a right to sex (there isn’t), but whether there is a duty to transfigure, as best we can, our desires.
To take this question seriously requires that we recognise that the very idea of fixed sexual preference is political, not metaphysical. As a matter of good politics, we treat the preferences of others as sacred: we are rightly wary of speaking of what people really want, or what some idealised version of them would want. That way, we know, authoritarianism lies. This is true, most of all, in sex, where invocations of real or ideal desires have long been used as a cover for the rape of women and gay men. But the fact is that our sexual preferences can and do alter, sometimes under the operation of our own wills – not automatically, but not impossibly either. What’s more, sexual desire doesn’t always neatly conform to our own sense of it, as generations of gay men and women can attest. Desire can take us by surprise, leading us somewhere we hadn’t imagined we would ever go, or towards someone we never thought we would lust after, or love. In the very best cases, the cases that perhaps ground our best hope, desire can cut against what politics has chosen for us, and choose for itself.